Expectation bubbles in a spin model of markets: Intermittency from frustration across scales

A simple spin model is studied, motivated by the dynamics of traders in a market where expectation bubbles and crashes occur. The dynamics is governed by interactions which are frustrated across different scales: While ferromagnetic couplings connect each spin to its local neighborhood, an additional coupling relates each spin to the global magnetization. This new coupling is allowed to be anti-ferromagnetic. The resulting frustration causes a metastable dynamics with intermittency and phases of chaotic dynamics. The model reproduces main observations of real economic markets as power-law distributed returns and clustered volatility.Comment: 5 pages RevTeX, 5 figures eps, revised versio

Dynamics of Multidimensional Secession

We explore a generalized Seceder Model with variable size selection groups and higher dimensional genotypes, uncovering its well-defined mean-field limiting behavior. Mapping to a discrete, deterministic version, we pin down the upper critical size of the multiplet selection group, characterize all relevant dynamically stable fixed points, and provide a complete analytical description of its self-similar hierarchy of multiple branch solutions.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, PR

Irrelevance of memory in the minority game

By means of extensive numerical simulations we show that all the distinctive features of the minority game introduced by Challet and Zhang (1997), are completely independent from the memory of the agents. The only crucial requirement is that all the individuals must posses the same information, irrespective of the fact that this information is true or false.Comment: 4 RevTeX pages, 4 figure

Perturbation theory in a pure exchange non-equilibrium economy

We develop a formalism to study linearized perturbations around the equilibria of a pure exchange economy. With the use of mean field theory techniques, we derive equations for the flow of products in an economy driven by heterogeneous preferences and probabilistic interaction between agents. We are able to show that if the economic agents have static preferences, which are also homogeneous in any of the steady states, the final wealth distribution is independent of the dynamics of the non-equilibrium theory. In particular, it is completely determined in terms of the initial conditions, and it is independent of the probability, and the network of interaction between agents. We show that the main effect of the network is to determine the relaxation time via the usual eigenvalue gap as in random walks on graphs.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figure

A Prototype Model of Stock Exchange

A prototype model of stock market is introduced and studied numerically. In this self-organized system, we consider only the interaction among traders without external influences. Agents trade according to their own strategy, to accumulate his assets by speculating on the price's fluctuations which are produced by themselves. The model reproduced rather realistic price histories whose statistical properties are also similar to those observed in real markets.Comment: LaTex, 4 pages, 4 Encapsulated Postscript figures, uses psfi

Multi-market minority game: breaking the symmetry of choice

Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then market occupancies become inhomogeneous with preference given to this market where the fluctuation occured first. There exists a critical size of agent population above which agents on bigger market behave collectively. In this regime there always exists a history of decisions for which all agents on a bigger market react identically.Comment: 15 pages, 12 figures, Accepted to 'Advances in Complex Systems

Self-organized Networks of Competing Boolean Agents

A model of Boolean agents competing in a market is presented where each agent bases his action on information obtained from a small group of other agents. The agents play a competitive game that rewards those in the minority. After a long time interval, the poorest player's strategy is changed randomly, and the process is repeated. Eventually the network evolves to a stationary but intermittent state where random mutation of the worst strategy can change the behavior of the entire network, often causing a switch in the dynamics between attractors of vastly different lengths.Comment: 4 pages, 3 included figures. Some text revision and one new figure added. To appear in PR